Obligatory Presuppositions

Pascal Amsili

Université Paris Diderot & LLF amsili@linguist.jussieu.fr

3rd CAuLD Meeting, Nancy, December 14-15 2009 On going joint research with Claire Beyssade



1/46

Introduction I

- (1) a. Jean a fait une grosse erreur. Il ne la fera plus. John made a big mistake. He won't do it again
 - b. # Jean a fait une grosse erreur. Il ne la fera pas.
 John made a big mistake. He won't do it

(2) a. Jo had fish and Mo did toob. # Jo had fish and Mo did

F

Introduction II


- presupposition entailed by the current discourse
- (a) cases : the presupposition is **bound** (i.e., no accommodation)
- at the level of the whole discourse, the content of the presupposition is redundant
- use of a presupposition trigger obligatory



Redundancy

assertion – assertion : $|\mathbf{X}|$ (3) # It's raining. It's raining presupposition – assertion : |X|(4) # John knows that it's raining. It's raining. [van der Sandt, 1988] assertion – presupposition : 🗸 (5) a. It's raining. John knows that it's raining. b. John made a mistake. He won't do it again.

Redundancy



4 / 46

Outline

Previous accounts : obligatory too and additives

Kaplan : obligatory-ness of too

Krifka : distinctiveness constraint

Sæbø : back to presupposition

Data

Many triggers are obligatory

Not all triggers are obligatory

Proposals

Class of triggers Pragmatic explanation

Open issues

Obligatory-Ness ? Discourse sensitivity Variation of obligatory-ness Particles with asserted content Argumentative orientation



Obligatory Presuppositions

Previous accounts : obligatory too and additives

Previous accounts : obligatory too and additives

Kaplan : obligatory-ness of *too* Krifka : distinctiveness constraint Sæbø : back to presupposition

Data

Many triggers are obligatory Not all triggers are obligatory

Proposals

Class of triggers

Pragmatic explanation

Open issues

Obligatory-Ness?

Discourse sensitivity

Variation of obligatory-ness

Particles with asserted content

Argumentative orientation



Kaplan : obligatory-ness of too (1)

- (9) a. Jo had fish and Mo did toob. * Jo had fish and Mo did
- (10) a. Reagan frightens Jo but he does Mo toob. * Reagan frightens Jo but he does Mo

[Kaplan, 1984]

Discourse role

too "emphasize the similarity between members of a pair of contrasting items" (p. 516)

PARIS DIDEROT

Kaplan : obligatory-ness of too (2)

- limited to 'bisentential' too (S_1 and/but S_2 too)
- unclear predictions
- variation of obligatory-ness connected to variation of contrast
 - (11) a. Jo likes syntax and she likes phonetics ($? \emptyset \ / \ {\rm too}).$
 - b. Jo likes syntax but she likes phonetics (* \emptyset / too).
 - c. Jo has lived in NY and she has lived in LA (\emptyset / too).



Obligatory Presuppositions

Previous accounts : obligatory *too* and additives

Krifka : distinctiveness constraint

Krifka : distinctiveness constraint

- Additive particles occurring after their focus
- Focus and topic accents

Obligatory Presuppositions

Previous accounts : obligatory *too* and additives

Krifka : distinctiveness constraint

Krifka : distinctiveness constraint (2)

- Congruent answer and focus accent
- (13) a. A : What did Peter eat?
 - b. B : Peter ate pasta
 - c. B' : * Peter ate pasta

Partial answer and contrastive topic accent [Büring, 1998]

- Previous accounts : obligatory *too* and additives

└─Krifka : distinctiveness constraint

Krifka : distinctiveness constraint (3)

Distinctiveness constraint

If $[\ldots T \ldots C \ldots]$ is a contrastive answer to a question, then there is no alternative T' of T such that the speaker is willing to assert $[\ldots T' \ldots C \ldots]$.

- too allows to violate distinctiveness
- (15) a. A : What did Peter and Pia eat ?
 b. B : * Peter ate pasta, and Pia ate pasta
 c. B' : Peter ate pasta, and Pia ate pasta, too

Obligatory Presuppositions

Previous accounts : obligatory *too* and additives

└─Krifka : distinctiveness constraint

Krifka : distinctiveness constraint (4)

- A contrastive topic accent in the first part of the a triggers a distinctiveness implicature
- too "cancels" this implicature

- $\rightarrow\,$ The obligatory-ness of too is explained only when there is a contrastive accent
- $\rightarrow~$ Only additive particles are concerned

Sæbø : back to presupposition I

(16) When the gods arrive at Jotunheim, the giants prepare the wedding feast. But during the feast, the bride —Thor, that is— devours an entire ox and eight salmon. He also drinks three barrels of beer. This astonishes Thrym. But Loki averts the danger by explaining that Freyja has been looking forward to coming to Jotunheim so much that she has not eaten for a week. When Thrym lifts the bridal veil to kiss the bride, he is startled to find himself looking into Thor's burning eyes. This time, ($\# \emptyset / \text{too}$), Loki saves the situation, explaining that the bride has not slept for a week for longing for Jotunheim.



Sæbø : back to presupposition II

- The obligatory-ness of *too* should be explained by the inferences triggered by the *second* sentence
- (17) Swift Deer could see pine-clad mountains on the other side of the Rain Valley. Far away to the east and west the dry prairies stretched out as far as the eye could see. (i) To the north lay the yellow-brown desert, a low belt of green cactus-covered ridges and distant blue mountain ranges with sharp peaks.
 (ii) To the south (# Ø / too) he could see mountains.

Obligatory Presuppositions

Previous accounts : obligatory *too* and additives

Sæbø : back to presupposition

Sæbø : back to presupposition III

- Presupposition more important than contrast
- Explanation based on a reasoning triggered by the second sentence



Obligatory Presuppositions

Previous accounts : obligatory too and additives

 \square Sæbø : back to presupposition

Summary

- Importance of presupposition
- Rôle of discourse function
- What is the class of triggers involved?

Previous accounts : obligatory *too* and additives Kaplan : obligatory-ness of *too* Krifka : distinctiveness constraint Sæbø : back to presupposition

Data

Many triggers are obligatory Not all triggers are obligatory

Proposals

Class of triggers

Pragmatic explanation

Open issues

Obligatory-Ness?

Discourse sensitivity

Variation of obligatory-ness

Particles with asserted content

Argumentative orientation



Many triggers are obligatory

Additive particles

(18) a. Jean est malade, Marie est malade ($\# \emptyset / aussi$) John is sick, Mary is sick (\emptyset / too)

(19) a. Jean n'est pas malade, Marie n'est pas malade (# Ø / non plus)
 John is not sick, Mary is not sick (Ø / either)

Aspectual particles

- (20) a. Léa a fait une bêtise. Elle ne la ($\# \emptyset / \text{re-}$)fera pas. Lea did a silly thing. She won't ($\emptyset / \text{re-}$) do it.
 - b. Il était là hier, il est ($\# \emptyset$ / encore / toujours) là. He was there yesterday, he is (\emptyset / again / still) there
 - c. Il a appelé hier. Il a de nouveau appelé aujourd'hui *He called yesterday. He called again today*
 - d. Ce site a été créé il y a deux ans. Il n'existe (# pas / plus)
 This site was created two years ago. It doesn't exist (Ø / anymore)

PARIS DIDEROT — Data

└─ Many triggers are obligatory

Factive verbs (1)

know that vs. know whether

(21) a. Léa est partie en Afrique. Jean ne le dit à personne, bien qu'il sache (# si / que) elle est partie là-bas.
Lea's gone to Africa. John tells no one, even though he knows (whether / that) she's gone there



— Data

└─ Many triggers are obligatory

Factive verbs (2)

vérifier que vs. vérifier si

(22) a. Il y a eu une fuite d'eau, mais quelqu'un l'a réparée. Jean a appelé le plombier pour qu'il vérifie (? si / que) le problème est réglé.
 There was a leakage, but somebody fixed it. Jean called the plumber so that he checks (whether / that) the problem is solved



— Data

└─ Many triggers are obligatory

Factive verbs (3)

ignorer que vs. ignorer si

 (23) a. Jean est revenu de vacances. Mais comme il n'a téléphoné à personne, au bureau, tout le monde ignore (? si / que) il est chez lui.

> John has come back from vacation. But since he called no one, at his office everybody 'ignores' (whether / that) he is at home.



Clefts and prosody

- Clefts and prosody in English
- $\left(24\right)\,$ a. Someone fixed the dinner. It is John who did it.
 - b. Someone fixed the dinner. JOHN did it.
 - c. # Someone fixed the dinner. John did it.
 - Clefts in French
- (25) a. Quelqu'un a préparé le dîner. Ce n'est pas Jean qui l'a fait/# Jean ne l'a pas fait. Someone fixed the dinner. It is not Jean who did it / Jean did not do it

└─ Not all triggers are obligatory

Not all presupposition triggers

- (26) a. Max owns a Ferrari. No one but Max doesb. Max owns a Ferrari. Only Max does
- (27) a. It is raining. Bob doesn't like it when it rains.b. It is raining. Bob regrets that it's raining.



└─ Not all triggers are obligatory



(28) a. * John used to smoke a lot, but he does not
b. John used to smoke a lot, but he does not anymore
c. John used to smoke a lot, but he has stopped doing so

Can we talk about obligatory-ness?

└─ Not all triggers are obligatory



(29) a. # A father of the victim arrived at the scene b. The father of the victim arrived at the scene [Heim, 1991], [Sauerland, 2003]

Case with no discourse linking



L Data

└─Not all triggers are obligatory

Summary

- Class of triggers
- General explanation



Previous accounts : obligatory *too* and additives Kaplan : obligatory-ness of *too* Krifka : distinctiveness constraint Sæbø : back to presupposition

Data

Many triggers are obligatory Not all triggers are obligatory

Proposals

Class of triggers Pragmatic explanation pen issues Obligatory-Ness ? Discourse sensitivity Variation of obligatory-ness Particles with asserted conten Argumentative orientation



- additive particles
- aspectual particles
- clefts / intonation
- some factive verbs/constructions

 \longrightarrow What do they have in common?

Obligatory Presuppositions	
Proposals	
└─ Class of triggers	

trigger
$$[\phi] = \begin{array}{cc} \phi & + & \psi \\ assertion & + & presupposition \end{array}$$

Triggers with no asserted content

Consider two sentences, S_1 and S_2 , which only differ with respect to their presuppositional content P.

 $\begin{array}{l} \mathsf{S}_1 \ \langle A, \emptyset \rangle \ i.e. \ \mathsf{S}_1 \ \text{asserts} \ A \ \text{and} \ \text{conveys} \ \text{no presupposition} \\ \mathsf{S}_2 \ \langle A, P \rangle \ i.e. \ \mathsf{S}_1 \ \text{asserts} \ A \ \text{and} \ \text{presupposes} \ P \end{array}$

We claim that in a context where the content P has been asserted, the use of S_2 is obligatory.

(30) a. $\# P. S_1.$ b. $P. S_2.$

Larger class?

It might be the case that triggers $\boldsymbol{\mathsf{with}}$ asserted content play a role :

- they can't be obligatory
- when they perform the discourse linking, no other trigger is obligatory

A Pragmatic Explanation (1)

Starting point : maximize presupposition
 (31) a. # A father of the victim arrived at the scene
 b. The father of the victim arrived at the scene
 (a, the) forms an alternative pair

Make your contribution presuppose as much as possible [Heim, 1991]

In Sauerland / Percus terminology, (31) is unfelicitous because it triggers an implicated presupposition / antipresupposition incompatible with background knowledge

PARIS DIDEROT

A Pragmatic Explanation (2)

(32) John made a mistake. He won't do it (# \emptyset / again).

Assertion : John made a mistake

 $Choice: \ S_1: He \ won't \ do \ it$

 $S_2 \,:\, He \text{ won't do it again}$

 \blacktriangleright S₂ is 'presuppositionaly stronger' than S₁

 $S_2 \rightarrow S_1$ but not $S_1 \rightarrow S_2$

S₁ antipresupposes 'John made a mistake' *i.e.*

 S_1 implicates 'John didn't make any mistake', which is incompatible with the assertion of the first sentence. Thus (A. S_1) is unfelicitous.

On the contrary, S_2 doesn't convey any antipresupposition. Thus (A. $\mathsf{S}_2)$ is felicitous



A Pragmatic Explanation (3)

```
    Percus' alternative pairs :

        (the, a), (both, every), (the, every), ....
```


```
• our pairs :
\langle too, \emptyset \rangle, \langle again, \emptyset \rangle, \langle anymore, \emptyset \rangle, \langle cleft, \emptyset \rangle,
\langle that, whether \rangle, ...
```

Difference : $\langle TR(S), S \rangle$



Explanation

Krifka's proposal





Proposals

Explanation

Our proposal



Previous accounts : obligatory *too* and additives Kaplan : obligatory-ness of *too* Krifka : distinctiveness constraint Sæbø : back to presupposition

Data

Many triggers are obligatory Not all triggers are obligatory

Proposals

Class of triggers Pragmatic explanation

Open issues

Obligatory-Ness ? Discourse sensitivity Variation of obligatory-ness Particles with asserted content Argumentative orientation



Obligatory-Ness?

- (33) a. Barb is seventeen, and WENDY is old enough to have a driver's license, too
 - b. # Barb is seventeen, and WENDY is old enough to have a driver's license

[Green, 1968]

- (34) a. The 5000 m race was won by Gianni Romme. The 1500 m race was won by a Dutch skater.
 - b. The 5000 m race was won by Gianni Romme. The 1500 m race was won by a Dutch skater too. [Sæbø, 2004]

Discourse sensitivity Enumeration

- (35) a. Jean est malade, Marie est malade, Paul est malade, tout le monde est malade alors ! John is sick, Marie is sick, Paul is sick, everybody is sick then !
- Specific prosody for enumeration

(36) John is sick + enumeration contour sick(j) + $\exists x \ (x \neq j \land sick(x))$

"cataphoric presupposition"

-Open issues

Discourse sensitivity

Discourse sensitivity Contrast/parallel

- (37) a. Il était là hier, il est là aujourd'hui He was there yesterday, he is there today
 - b. Il était là hier, il est encore là aujourd'hui He was there yesterday, he is still there today



Open issues

└─Variation of obligatory-ness

Variation of obligatory-ness Back to Kaplan

- Variability of obligatory-ness
- (38) a. Jo likes syntax and she likes phonetics ($? \emptyset \ / \ too).$
 - b. Jo likes syntax but she likes phonetics ($* \emptyset \ / \ too).$
 - c. Jo has lived in NY and she has lived in LA (ø / too).
- Tentative explanation
- (39) a. Jo likes syntax and [she likes phonetics]_F (?Ø / too).
 b. Jo likes syntax but she likes [phonetics]_F (*Ø / too).

Open issues

Particles with asserted content

Particles with asserted content

- (40) A : Est-ce que Marie est venue?
 B : Oui.
 A : Et Jean? / Jean aussi? / * Jean? (cf Engdalh)
- (41) A : Marie est venue.
 - B : Est-ce que Jean est venu (* \emptyset / aussi / lui)?
- (42) Marie est légère
– Moi, je suis légère (*Ø / aussi)

-Argumentative orientation

Argumentative orientation

- (43) Luc connaît tous les invités et Max en connaît (aussi / Ø) la plupart Luc knows all the guests and Max (also / /emptyset) knows most of them
- (44) a. Luc ne connaît pas tous les invités, et Max en connaît seulement quelques uns Luc doesn't know all the guests, and Max only knows some of them
 - b. * Luc ne connaît pas tous les invités, et Max aussi en connaît seulement quelques-uns Luc doesn't know all the guests, and Max too only knows some of them

Conclusion

- Obligatory-ness : wide phenomenon obligatory discourse linking
- Natural class of presupposition triggers
- Reasoning about alternatives relevant fo discourse linking
- Additional argument in favor of presupposition as anaphora
- Issues :
 - Articulation with discourse still to be understood
 - How reasonable is it to assume a comparison between "S" and "S + too" ?
 - how many classes of pairs ?
 (too, ∅)
 (both, every) : both asserts every and presupposes |n| = 2
 (the, a) : the doesn't assert a.

Open issues

Argumentative orientation

Selected references



Daniel Büring.

The 59th street bridge accent. Routledge, London, 1998.



Georgia M. Green.

On too and either, and not just too and either, either. In CLS (Chicago Linguistics Society), volume 4, pages 22–39, 1968.



Irene Heim.

Artikel und Definitheit.

In Arnim von Stechow and Dieter Wunderlich, editors, Semantik : Ein internationales Handbuch des zeitgenössischen Forschung, pages 487–535. de Gruyter, Berlin, 1991.



Jeff Kaplan.

Obligatory too in english.

Language, 60(3) :510-518, 1984.



Orin Percus.

Antipresuppositions.

In U. Ueyama, editor, Theoretical and Empirical Studies of Reference and Anaphora : Toward the establishment of generative grammar as empirical science, pages 52–73. Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, 2006.

Report of the Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research. Also available at Semantic Archive.



Uli Sauerland.

Implicated presuppositions.

Hand-out for a talk given at the *Polarity, Scalar Phenomena, Implicatures* Workshop, University of Milan Bicocca, Milan, Italy, jun 2003.



PARIS DIDEROT