

Accurately Benchmarking Efficiency of Pairing-Based Attribute-Based Encryption

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Motivation

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- **Our goal:** accurately benchmarking and comparing schemes, efficiency analysis, new speed records

High-level overview


- 1 Introduction to ABE
- 2 Why is benchmarking ABE difficult?
- 3 ABE Squared
- 4 Towards automating ABE Squared
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
Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE)

Setup:




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
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
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


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


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Decryption:



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- By its functionality, ABE implements access control
- Popular in settings in which data has to be stored on untrusted platforms
- The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) considers several use cases for ABE, e.g., Cloud, IoT 
- More recently, Cloudflare has presented an updated version of their Geo Key Manager: Portunus 

Requirements for ABE

These use cases share many common requirements for ABE:

- **Expressive policies:** policies should support Boolean formulas consisting of AND and OR operators
- **Large universes:** attribute could be any arbitrary string, e.g., names, roles, MAC addresses
- **Unbounded:** no bounds on any parameters, such as the length of the policies or attribute sets

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Storage and computational efficiency requirements may vary per use case.

Requirements for storage and computational efficiency

Examples:

- Portunus and cloud settings: fast decryption
- Internet of Things: small ciphertexts, fast encryption

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- Most established: many desirable practical properties, high security guarantees and efficient
- Unfortunately, not post-quantum secure
- Post-quantum secure schemes exist
- However, still heavily under development, e.g., to achieve the same desirable properties

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Typically, in ABE:

- Choose a framework for rapid prototyping, e.g., Charm [AGM⁺13]
- Implement, maybe optimize some parts

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
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Some of these really depend on what the designer tries to optimize, e.g., the decryption algorithm for Cloudflare's use case

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Overview of ABE Squared




The arrows have the following meaning:

$a \rightarrow b$ = "a influences b"

$a \cdots \rightarrow b$ = "a may require adjustment in b"

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Overview of ABE Squared (continued)



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- Previous type-conversion methods typically only allow for optimized key or ciphertext sizes
- These cannot be used to optimize decryption
- We provide manual heuristics that take the interactions between the different layers into account
- Allows us to better optimize e.g., the decryption algorithm than previous methods allow

Optimized type conversion

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Our heuristics: find most efficient instantiation in \mathbb{G} and \mathbb{H} given a specific design goal. (Also depends on the chosen group!)

Benchmarks for differently optimized schemes

Implementation of Wat11-I in RELIC, on the BLS12-381 curve, based on their optimization approaches¹ (OA). The costs are expressed in 10^3 clock cycles².

OA	Key generation				Encryption				Decryption			
	# of attributes				# of attributes				# of attributes			
	1	10	100	Increase	1	10	100	Increase	1	10	100	Increase
OE & OD	759	3029	25653	143.0%	990	4540	39951	-	2005	7379	58515	-
OK	317	1249	10555	-	1756	10814	101181	153.3%	2016	7611	63151	7.9%

¹ OE/OD/OK = optimized encryption/decryption/key generation.

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- Design goal influences the type conversion
- e.g., it yields a difference of a factor of ≈ 2.5 in computational costs for BLS12-381

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Performance analysis

To demonstrate the framework, we have implemented and benchmarked three schemes with the same practical properties (achieved in different ways) in RELIC:

- Wat11-IV [Wat11]: implemented in libraries such as Charm and OpenABE
- RW13 [RW13]: implemented in Charm, outperformed by Wat11-IV
- AC17-LU [AC17]: not implemented

Many follow-up works build on these schemes and are structurally similar. Note that all these schemes satisfy the three important properties that we mentioned earlier (i.e., expressive, large-universe and unbounded).

Benchmarks for 100 attributes

OA	Scheme	Curve	Key generation		Encryption		Decryption	
			Costs	Increase %	Costs	Increase %	Costs	Increase %
OE	Wat11-IV	BLS12-381	42275	0.2%	77641	48.8%	58290	543.4%
	RW13	BLS12-381	51401	21.8%	54491	4.4%	112072	1137.1%
	AC17-LU	BLS12-381	42196	-	52176	-	9060	-
OK	Wat11-IV	BLS12-381	42135	94.6%	77898	48.9%	58441	543.9%
	RW13	BLS12-381	21657	-	128221	145.0%	118998	1211.2%
	AC17-LU	BLS12-381	41913	93.5%	52326	-	9076	-
OD	Wat11-IV	BLS12-381	42275	-	77641	42.5%	58290	1336.5%
	RW13	BLS12-381	51401	21.6%	54491	-	112072	2661.9%
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- For an optimized encryption or decryption, use AC17-LU
- For an optimized key generation, use RW13
- **Surprising result:** RW13 outperforms Wat11-IV in the key generation and encryption algorithms

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Future work: automation and more curves

- For future work, it would be valuable to automate ABE Squared
- Furthermore, it would be valuable to analyze the efficiency of schemes for more curves
- Existing libraries for curve arithmetic often support very few curves
- There exist many curves at the 128-bit security level (see <https://members.loria.fr/AGuillevic/pairing-friendly-curves/>):

Curve	k	D	u	ref	p (bits)	r (bits)	$p^{k/2}$ (G_2 , bits)	p^k (bits)
Curve for fastest pairing								
Barreto–Lynn–Scott BLS12, cyclotomic $r(x)$	12	3	$-(2^{73}+2^{72}+2^{50}+2^{24})$	eprint 2017/334	440	295	p^2 , 880	5280
Barreto–Lynn–Scott BLS12, cyclotomic $r(x)$	12	3	$-(2^{12} \cdot 2^{48} \cdot 2^{71} + 2^{74})$	eprint 2017/334	442	296	p^2 , 884	5296
Barreto–Lynn–Scott BLS12, cyclotomic $r(x)$	12	3	$-(2^{74}+2^{73}+2^{63}+2^{57}+2^{50}+2^{17}+1)$	eprint 2019/885	446	299	p^2 , 892	5352
Fotiadis–Martindale FM17, Aurifeuillean $r(x)$	12	3	$-2^{72} \cdot 2^{71} \cdot 2^{36}$	eprint 2019/555	447	296	p^2 , 894	5356
Kachisa–Schaefer–Scott KSS16	16	1	$-2^{34}+2^{27} \cdot 2^{23}+2^{20} \cdot 2^{11}+1$	eprint 2017/334	330	257	p^4 , 1320	5280
Kachisa–Schaefer–Scott KSS16	16	1	$2^{34} \cdot 2^{30}+2^{26}+2^{23}+2^{14} \cdot 2^{5}+1$	eprint 2019/1371	330	256	p^4 , 1320	5268
Kachisa–Schaefer–Scott KSS16	16	1	$2^{35} \cdot 2^{32} \cdot 2^{18}+2^{8}+1$	eprint 2017/334	339	263	p^4 , 1356	5411
Curve with small embedding degree k								
Cocks–Pinch modified	6	3	$2^{128} \cdot 2^{124} \cdot 2^{69}$, $h_1=-1$, $h_2=2^{80} \cdot 2^{70} \cdot 2^{66} \cdot 0x3fe0 = 0xffbbfffffffffffc020$	eprint 2019/431	672	256	p , 672	4028
Cocks–Pinch modified	8	1	$2^{64} \cdot 2^{54}+2^{37}+2^{32} \cdot 4$, $h_1=1$, $h_2=0xdc04$	eprint 2019/431	544	256	p^2 , 1088	4349
Curve with smallest G_1								

Finding the best curve

- Implementing curve arithmetic for over 20 curves is (too) ambitious
- Perhaps a better approach: theoretically approximate the efficiency for each curve
- Extrapolate the efficiency of schemes using these approximations
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- Perhaps, BLS12-381 is already good enough
- BLS12-381 believed to currently provide 126 bits of security
- ABE schemes typically lose some extra bits of security
- Could be better to use a curve with > 128 bits of security
- Additionally, different curves have different efficiency trade-offs
- Natural to think that, for each scheme and design goal, there may be a different optimal curve

Performance estimations for some curves

We estimate the costs (very roughly!) for RW13 using the field-arithmetic benchmarks in [GMT20], in milliseconds:

OA	Curve	Key generation	Encryption	Decryption
OE/OD	BLS12-446	400	332	141
	CP8-544	173	431	122
	KSS16-330	874	218	102
OK/OD	BLS12-446	133	994	141
	CP8-544	173	431	122
	KSS16-330	87	2169	102

- KSS16-330 may yield better efficiencies for the one-algorithm optimization strategies (OK/OE/OD)
- More “balanced” curves such as CP8-544 may be more suitable for more “balanced” efficiencies among the algorithms

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- By optimizing multiple schemes with respect to the same goal, they can be compared more fairly
- Existing open-source libraries providing ABE implementations, e.g., Charm, OpenABE, can greatly benefit from our heuristics
- **Design goals matter:** for different goals, different schemes may perform the best

Thank you for your attention!

- Our paper:
 - ▶ TCHES: tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9486
 - ▶ eprint: <https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/038>
- Our code: https://github.com/abecryptools/abe_squared

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