# Voting systems and democracy 

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## LORIA

PhD Pizza time, March 2023

## Jeopardized democracy

In France, 2 important elections every 5 years.

Abstention rate in legislative 2022

| Round | Abstention rate |
| :---: | :---: |
| $1^{\text {st }}$ round | $52,49 \%$ |
| $2^{\text {nd }}$ round | $53,77 \%$ |

Abstention rate in presidential 2022

| Round | Abstention rate |
| :---: | :---: |
| $1^{\text {st }}$ round | $26,31 \%$ |
| $2^{\text {nd }}$ round | $28,01 \%$ |

## Outline

(1) Diagnosis of the situation
(2) District voting, a threat to democracy
(3) Proportional repartition for more democracy
(4) Two rounds elections, the majority dictatorship
(5) Can we improve the presidential?
(6) Conclusion

## A huge variety of ballots

In practice, democracy is ensured thanks to elections.
In France, several types of elections.

| The municipal elections |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Scale | Town |
| Who? | Mayor and councilors |
| When? | Every 6 years |
| Ballot | 2-rounds plurinominal <br> proportional repartition |


| The departmental elections |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Scale | Department |
| Who? | Departmental board |
| When? | Every 6 years |
| Ballot | 2-rounds binominal <br> two councilors per canton |

The legislative elections

| Scale | Country |
| :---: | :---: |
| Who? | Parliament members |
| When? | Every 5 years |
| Ballot | 2-rounds uninominal <br> one deputy per district |

## A huge variety of ballots

In practice, democracy is ensured thanks to elections.
In France, several types of elections.

| The European elections |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Scale | Country |
| Who? | European parliament |
| When? | Every 5 years |
| Ballot | 1-rounds plurinominal <br> a few deputies per region |


| The presidential elections |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Scale | Country |
| Who? | President |
| When? | Every 5 years |
| Ballot | 2-rounds uninominal |

## A huge variety of ballots

In practice, democracy is ensured thanks to elections.
In France, several types of elections. They all use a different ballot!

| Election | Scale | Ballot |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Municipal | Town | 2-rounds plurinominal, proportional |
| Departmental | Department | 2-rounds binominal, two per canton |
| Regional | Region | 2-rounds plurinominal, majority bonus |
| Legislative | Country | 2-rounds uninominal, one per district |
| European | Country | 1-round plurinominal, several per region |
| Presidential | Country | 2-rounds uninominal, one president |

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In practice, democracy is ensured thanks to elections.
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In France, several types of elections. They all use a different ballot! Already, we notice irregularities, some of which are explained.

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## A huge variety of ballots

In practice, democracy is ensured thanks to elections.
In France, several types of elections. They all use a different ballot!
Already, we notice irregularities, some of which are explained. (Are they?)
We also notice a strange rule.

| Election | Scale | Ballot |
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## Divide and conquer, a strategy that never gets old

A common case: one deputy per "geographic" division. But district boundaries are made by politicians!

HOW TO STEAL AN ELECTION



5 DISTRICTS 5 BLUE 0 RED BLUE WINS


5 DISTRICTS 3 RED
2 bLUE RED WINS
fairvote.org, September 2017

## Divide and conquer, a strategy that never gets old

This strategy is called gerrymandering


Political cartoon, March 1812

## Divide and conquer, a strategy that never gets old

Impact on France's legislative election, 2022 (governmental data):


Vote repartition, 2nd round
Original deputy repartition
Note: the districts did not change recently; this was not premeditated.

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## Rounding in a proportional repartition

In France, 577 seats in the assembly.

| Party | \% voices | \# deputies |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| LREM | $38.6 \%$ | 222.7 |
| NUPES | $31.6 \%$ | 182.3 |
| RN | $17.3 \%$ | 99.8 |
| LR | $7 \%$ | 40.4 |
| Others | $5.5 \%$ | 31.7 |

We need a rule to do the rounding!

## The D'Hondt method

This rule is used in Belgium.
Step 1. Successively divide the number of votes by $1,2,3, \cdots$
Step 2. Get the 577 highest values of the obtained list
Step 3. The corresponding parties get the seat

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Example

| divisors | LREM | NUPES | RN | LR | Others |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 38.6 | 31.6 | 17.3 | 7.0 | 5.5 |
| 2 | 19.3 | 15.8 | 8.65 | 3.5 | 2.75 |
| 3 | 12.87 | 10.53 | 5.77 | 2.33 | 1.83 |
| 4 | 9.65 | 7.9 | 4.33 | 1.75 | 1.38 |
| 5 | 7.72 | 6.32 | 3.46 | 1.4 | 1.1 |
| 6 | 6.43 | 5.27 | 2.88 | 1.17 | 0.92 |
| $\vdots$ | $\vdots$ | $\vdots$ | $\vdots$ | $\vdots$ | $\vdots$ |

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Result for the 2022 French legislative

| Party | \% voices | \# deputies | rounding |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| LREM | $38.6 \%$ | 222.7 | 223 |
| NUPES | $31.6 \%$ | 182.3 | 183 |
| RN | $17.3 \%$ | 99.8 | 100 |
| LR | $7 \%$ | 40.4 | 40 |
| Others | $5.5 \%$ | 31.7 | 31 |

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| RN | $17.3 \%$ | 99.8 | 100 |
| LR | $7 \%$ | 40.4 | 40 |
| Slightly favors |  |  |  |
| Others | $5.5 \%$ | 31.7 | 31 |

## Many other methods

There are many other methods to achieve proportional voting:

- Highest averages methods (ex: the D'Hondt method)
- Largest remainder methods
- Single Transferable Vote

They may favor small or large parties.

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Example: the majority bonus (used for regional elections)

- Gives $25 \%$ of the seats to the winner
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- Highest averages methods (ex: the D'Hondt method)
- Largest remainder methods
- Single Transferable Vote

They may favor small or large parties.
Example: the majority bonus (used for regional elections)

- Gives $25 \%$ of the seats to the winner
- Use proportional repartition for the others
- You only need $33 \%$ of the voices to get the majority!


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## The second round promotes useful and strategical voting

Results of the first round of the presidential 2022, by political alignment

| Candidate | $1{ }^{\text {st }}$ round score | \}Extreme left (1,33\%) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Nathalie ARTHAUD | 0,56\% |  |
| Philippe POUTOU | 0,77\% |  |
| Fabien ROUSSEL | 2, 28\% | \}Left (30, 61\%) |
| Jean-Luc MÉLENCHON | 21,95\% |  |
| Yannick JADOT | 4,63\% |  |
| Anne HIDALGO | 1,75\% |  |
| Jean LASSALLE | 3,13\% |  |
| Emmanuel MACRON | 27,85\% | \}Right (34,69\%) |
| Valérie PÉCRESSE | 4,78\% |  |
| Nicolas DUPONT-AIGNAN | 2,06\% |  |
| Marine LE PEN | 23,15\% | \} Extreme right (30, 22\%) |
| Éric ZEMMOUR | 7,07\% |  |

## The second round kills representativity

Results of the first round of the presidential 2022, by political alignment
$\left.\begin{array}{|c|c|}\hline \text { Candidate } & 1^{\text {st }} \text { round score } \\ \hline \text { Nathalie ARTHAUD } & 0,56 \% \\ \hline \text { Philippe POUTOU } & 0,77 \% \\ \hline \text { Fabien ROUSSEL } & 2,28 \% \\ \hline \text { Jean-Luc MÉLENCHON } & 21,95 \% \\ \hline \text { Yannick JADOT } & 4,63 \% \\ \hline \text { Anne HIDALGO } & 1,75 \% \\ \hline \text { Jean LASSALLE } & 3,13 \% \\ \hline \text { Emmanuel MACRON } & 27,85 \% \\ \hline \text { Valérie PÉCRESSE } & 4,78 \% \\ \hline \text { Nicolas DUPONT-AIGNAN } & 2,06 \% \\ \text { Marine LE PEN } & 23,15 \% \\ \hline \text { Éric ZEMMOUR } & 7,07 \% \\ \hline\end{array}\right\}$ Left (30, 61\%)

Consequence: the minorities cannot express their opinion.

## Using only one round does not solve all problems

Number of seats per party after the legislative election, 2022

| Nuances de Candidats | Nb Sieges |
| :---: | :---: |
| Divers extrême gauche | $\mathbf{0}$ |
| Parti radical de gauche | $\mathbf{0}$ |
| NUPES | 131 |
| Divers gauche | 22 |
| Ecologistes | $\mathbf{0}$ |
| Divers | 1 |
| Régionalistes | 10 |
| Ensemble! | 245 |
| Divers centre | 7 |
| Les Républicains | 61 |
| Divers droite | 11 |
| Reconquête! | $\mathbf{0}$ |
| Rassemblement National | 89 |
| Divers extrême droite | $\mathbf{0}$ |

## Single transferable vote (STV)

STV is a voting system used in Australia, Canada, the USA and the UK.

1. Each voter order (some of) the candidates:

Elise's ballot

| Choice |
| :---: |
| Gandalf the White |
| Santa Clauss |
| Capybara |
| Agent Smith |
| Zarathoustra |
| Dora the explorer |

Maïwenn's ballot Choice
Capybara
Santa Clauss
Gandalf the White
Zarathoustra
Agent Smith
Dora the explorer

## Single transferable vote (STV)

2. A quota is set to get a seat
3. The first candidate on each ballot gets one vote

Elise's ballot

| Choice | Value |
| :---: | :---: |
| Gandalf | 1 |
| Santa Clauss | 0 |
| Capybara | 0 |
| Agent Smith | 0 |
| Zarathoustra | 0 |
| Dora | 0 |

Maïwenn's ballot
Overall score

| Choice | Value |
| :---: | :---: |
| Capybara | 1 |
| Santa Clauss | 0 |
| Gandalf | 0 |
| Zarathoustra | 0 |
| Agent Smith | 0 |
| Dora | 0 |


| Candidate | Score |
| :---: | :---: |
| Agent Smith | 7 |
| Capybara | 1000 |
| Dora | 25 |
| Gandalf | 16 |
| Santa Clauss | 36 |
| Zarathoustra | 21 |

Example with 6 candidates, 3 seats and 1105 voters. The quota is 277 .

## Single transferable vote (STV)

4. Those who reach the quota are selected.
5. The voices are transferred!

Elise's ballot

| Choice | Value |
| :---: | :---: |
| Gandalf | 1 |
| Santa Clauss | 0 |
| Capybara | 0 |
| Agent Smith | 0 |
| Zarathoustra | 0 |
| Dora | 0 |

Maïwenn's ballot
Overall score

Example with 6 candidates, 3 seats and 1105 voters. The quota is 277 .

## Single transferable vote (STV)

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Elise's ballot
Maïwenn's ballot
Overall score

| Choice | Value |
| :---: | :---: |
| Gandalf | 1 |
| Santa Clauss | 0 |
| Capybara | 0 |
| Agent Smith | 0 |
| Zarathoustra | 0 |
| Dora | 0 |


| Choice | Value |
| :---: | :---: |
| Capybara | 0,277 |
| Santa Clauss | 0.410 |
| Gandalf | 0.313 |
| Zarathoustra | 0 |
| Agent Smith | 0 |
| Dora | 0 |


| Candidate | Score |
| :---: | :---: |
| Agent Smith | 53 |
| Capybara | 277 |
| Dora | 44 |
| Gandalf | 256 |
| Santa Clauss | 277 |
| Zarathoustra | 198 |

Example with 6 candidates, 3 seats and 1105 voters. The quota is 277 .

## Single transferable vote (STV)

6. If no one reaches the quota, the least popular candidate is eliminated.
7. The voices are transferred!

Elise's ballot

| Choice | Value |
| :---: | :---: |
| Gandalf | 1 |
| Santa Clauss | 0 |
| Capybara | 0 |
| Agent Smith | 0 |
| Zarathoustra | 0 |
| Dora | 0 |

Maïwenn's ballot

| Choice | Value |
| :---: | :---: |
| Capybara | 0,277 |
| Santa Clauss | 0.410 |
| Gandalf | 0.313 |
| Zarathoustra | 0 |
| Agent Smith | 0 |
| Dora | 0 |

Overall score

| Candidate | Score |
| :---: | :---: |
| Agent Smith | 94 |
| Capybara | 277 |
| Dora | 0 |
| Gandalf | 259 |
| Santa Clauss | 277 |
| Zarathoustra | 198 |

Example with 6 candidates, 3 seats and 1105 voters. The quota is 277 .

## Single transferable vote (STV)

8. The processus is repeated until someone reaches the quota or enough candidates have been eliminated

Elise's ballot

| Choice | Value |
| :---: | :---: |
| Gandalf | 1 |
| Santa Clauss | 0 |
| Capybara | 0 |
| Agent Smith | 0 |
| Zarathoustra | 0 |
| Dora | 0 |


| Choice | Value |
| :---: | :---: |
| Capybara | 0,277 |
| Santa Clauss | 0.410 |
| Gandalf | 0.313 |
| Zarathoustra | 0 |
| Agent Smith | 0 |
| Dora | 0 |


| Candidate | Score |
| :---: | :---: |
| Agent Smith | 0 |
| Capybara | 277 |
| Dora | 0 |
| Gandalf | 311 |
| Santa Clauss | 277 |
| Zarathoustra | 240 |

Example with 6 candidates, 3 seats and 1105 voters. The quota is 277 .

## Single transferable vote (STV)

## Winners of the election:



Note: the progress of the example was not decided by Elise and Maïwenn.

## Single transferable vote (STV)

| Advantages | Disadvantages |
| :--- | :--- |
| Proportional repartition | Hard to undersand |
| Less strategical voting: | Hard to use: |
| - One vote, many rounds | - Rank (some of) the candidates |
| - Your vote is never lost | - Strict ordering |
|  | Hard to display the result |
| Visibility of small parties | Hard to tally |

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## STV still works: Instant Runoff Voting



## FIRSTLY...

Minor parties and independents can and do win seats if enough people vote for them. Since you lose nothing by voting " 1 " for whomever you like most, why wouldn't you?


## SECONDLY...

This might happen:
Preferences from Nice Party voters made a big difference!
I'll need to keep them happy if I want to beat Bamboot again next time.


## THIRDLY...

If a candidate gets at least 4\% of first preferences ("1" votes), they'll receive election funding for each of those votes*, which will help their next campaign!


* Approx. $\$ 2.76$ at the 2019 election. The amount is indexed every 6 months in line with CPI. Source: AEC (Nov. 2018)

See the full comics at chickennation.com/voting

## Condorcet methods

The Condorcet methods find the most "rightful" candidate
Condorcet winner: is preferred from all the others by a majority
Condorcet's strategy:

- Rank all candidates (you can give the same rank to several candidates)
- The Condorcet winner wins!

Condorcet paradox: There is not always a Condorcet winner...
A lot of Condorcet-compliant methods exist to solve this: Schulze method, ranked pairs, minimax... it is also possible to use IRV as a tie-break rule.

## Majority judgment

The majority judgment is the choice of the "collective intelligence"


- Très Bien
- Bien
Assez Bien
Passable
- Insuffisant(e)

Results of the left-wing primary election, 2022 (europe1.fr)

## Approval voting

The simplest solution would be to switch to approval voting

| Who would you like as <br> a PhD advisor? |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Niels Henrik Abel | $\square$ |
| Véronique Cortier | $\square$ |
| Sigmund Freud | $\square$ |
| Pierrick Gaudry | $\square$ |
| Victor Hugo | $\square$ |
| Adi Shamir | $\square$ |
| Zinedine Zidane | $\square$ |

## Conclusion

There are plenty of alternatives to improve the current situation!

| Voting system | Advantages | Disadvantages |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| STV | Expressive <br> Addresses stategical voting | Very complex <br> Strict ordering |
| Not Condorcet-compliant |  |  |

