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@InProceedings{CCM-fsttcs15,
  author ={Vincent Cheval and V{\'e}ronique Cortier and Eric le Morvan},
  title ={{Secure Refinements of Communication Channels}},
  booktitle ={35th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2015)},
  pages ={575--589},
  series ={Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN ={978-3-939897-97-2},
  ISSN ={1868-8969},
  year ={2015},
  volume ={45},
  editor ={Prahladh Harsha and G. Ramalingam},
  publisher ={Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik},
  address ={Dagstuhl, Germany},
  doi ={10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2015.575},
abstract = {It is a common practice to design a protocol (say Q) assuming some
secure channels. Then the secure channels are implemented using
any standard protocol, e.g. TLS. In this paper, we study when
such a practice is indeed secure. 
\par
We provide a characterization of both confidential and authenticated
channels. As an application, we study several protocols of the
literature including TLS and BAC protocols. Thanks to our result,
we can consider a larger number of sessions when analyzing complex protocols
resulting from explicit implementation of  the secure channels of some
more abstract protocol Q.},
}