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@article{CortierDL-JCS05,
author = {Cortier, V{\'e}ronique and Delaune, St{\'e}phanie and
Lafourcade, Pascal},
journal = {Journal of Computer Security},
number = {1},
pages = {1-43},
publisher = {{IOS} Press},
title = {A Survey of Algebraic Properties Used in
Cryptographic Protocols},
volume = {14},
year = {2006},
abstract = {Cryptographic protocols are successfully analyzed
using formal methods. However, formal approaches
usually consider the encryption schemes as black
boxes and assume that an adversary cannot learn
anything from an encrypted message except if he has
the key. Such an assumption is too strong in general
since some attacks exploit in a clever way the
interaction between protocol rules and properties of
cryptographic operators. Moreover, the executability
of some protocols relies explicitly on some algebraic
properties of cryptographic primitives such as
commutative encryption. We give a list of some
relevant algebraic properties of cryptographic
operators, and for each of them, we provide examples
of protocols or attacks using these properties. We
also give an overview of the existing methods in
formal approaches for analyzing cryptographic
protocols.},
}