@COMMENT This file was generated by bib2html.pl <https://sourceforge.net/projects/bib2html/> version 0.94
@COMMENT written by Patrick Riley <http://sourceforge.net/users/patstg/>
@inproceedings{post12-vote,
doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-28641-4_7},
   address = {Tallinn, Estonia}, 
   author = {Cortier, V{\'e}ronique and Wiedling, Cyrille}, 
   booktitle = {{P}roceedings of the 1st {I}nternational {C}onference on {P}rinciples of {S}ecurity and {T}rust ({POST}'12)}, 
   month = mar, 
   publisher = {Springer}, 
   series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, 
   title = {A formal analysis of the Norwegian E-voting protocol}, 
   volume    = {7215},
   year      = {2012},
   pages     = {109--128},
   abstract = {Norway has used e-voting in its last political election in September 2011, with more than 25 000 voters using the e-voting option. The underlying protocol is a new protocol designed by the ERGO group, involving several actors (a bulletin box but also a receipt generator, a decryption service,  and an auditor).
Of course, trusting the correctness and security of e-voting protocols is crucial in that context. Formal definitions of properties such as privacy, coercion-resistance or verifiability have been recently proposed, based on equivalence properties.
\par 
In this paper, we propose a formal analysis of the protocol used in Norway, w.r.t. privacy, considering several corruption scenarios. Part of this study has conducted using the ProVerif tool, on a simplified model.},
}