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@inproceedings{BDGK-csf17,
abstract = {In symbolic verification of security protocols,
process equivalences have recently been used
extensively to model strong secrecy, anonymity and
unlinkability properties. However, tool support for
automated analysis of equivalence properties is
limited compared to trace properties, \eg modeling
authentication and weak notions of secrecy. In this
paper, we present a novel procedure for verifying
equivalences on finite processes, i.e., without
replication, for protocols that rely on various
cryptographic primitives including exclusive or
(xor). We have implemented our procedure in the tool
AKISS, and successfully used it on several case
studies that are outside the scope of existing
tools, e.g., unlinkability on various RFID
protocols, and resistance against guessing attacks
on protocols that use xor. },
address = {Santa Barbara, USA},
author = {Baelde, David and Delaune, St{\'e}phanie and Gazeau,
Ivan and Kremer, Steve},
booktitle = {{P}roceedings of the 30th {IEEE} {C}omputer
{S}ecurity {F}oundations {S}ymposium ({CSF}'17)},
month = aug,
publisher = {{IEEE} Computer Society Press},
title = {Symbolic verification of privacy-type properties for
security protocols with XOR},
year = 2017,
acronym = {{CSF}'17},
nmonth = 8,
}