

A decision procedure for proving symbolic equivalence

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Example

0. $A \rightarrow B : \{\langle N_a, \text{pk}(sk_a) \rangle\}_{\text{pk}(sk_b)}$
1. $B \rightarrow A : \{\langle N_a, \langle N_b, \text{pk}(sk_b) \rangle \rangle\}_{\text{pk}(sk_a)}$

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Security property : Anonymity

The identity of the principal A cannot be revealed to the attacker.

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Formally

$$\begin{aligned} & c(\text{pk}(sk_a)).c(\text{pk}(sk_{a'})).c(\text{pk}(sk_b)) \mid P_A(a, b) \mid P_B(b, a) \\ & \quad \approx \\ & c(\text{pk}(sk_a)).c(\text{pk}(sk_{a'})).c(\text{pk}(sk_b)) \mid P_A(a', b) \mid P_B(b, a') \end{aligned}$$

Automatic procedure to prove equivalence properties

- Huttel (2002)
- Blanchet, Abadi, Fournet (2008) : ProVerif
- Cortier, Delaune (2009) + Baudet (2005)
- Chevalier, Rusinowitch (2009)
- ...

Rewrite rules

- $\text{dec}(\text{enc}(x, y), y) \rightarrow x$
- $\text{adec}(\text{aenc}(x, \text{pk}(y)), y) \rightarrow x$
- $\text{check}(\text{sign}(x, y), \text{pk}(y)) \rightarrow x$
- $\pi_1(\langle x, y \rangle) \rightarrow x$ and $\pi_2(\langle x, y \rangle) \rightarrow y$

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For each interleaving, one constraint system.

Constraint System :

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{pk}(k_a), \text{pk}(k_b), \{\langle n_a, \text{pk}(k_a) \rangle\}_{\text{pk}(k_b)} \quad \vdash \{\langle x, y \rangle\}_{\text{pk}(k_b)} \\ \text{pk}(k_a), \text{pk}(k_b), \{\langle n_a, \text{pk}(k_a) \rangle\}_{\text{pk}(k_b)}, \{\langle x, n_b, \text{pk}(k_b) \rangle\}_y \vdash \{\langle n_a, z, \text{pk}(k_b) \rangle\}_{\text{pk}(k_a)} \end{array}$$

Solution of a constraint system

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{pk}(k_a), \text{pk}(k_b), \{\langle n_a, \text{pk}(k_a) \rangle\}_{\text{pk}(k_b)} \quad \vdash \{\langle x, y \rangle\}_{\text{pk}(k_b)} \\ \text{pk}(k_a), \text{pk}(k_b), \{\langle n_a, \text{pk}(k_a) \rangle\}_{\text{pk}(k_b)}, \{\langle x, n_b, \text{pk}(k_b) \rangle\}_y \vdash \{\langle n_a, z, \text{pk}(k_b) \rangle\}_{\text{pk}(k_a)} \end{array}$$

Solution of a constraint system

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{ax}_1 \quad \text{ax}_2 \quad \text{ax}_3 \quad \text{ax}_4 \\ X_1 \text{ pk}(k_a), \text{pk}(k_b), \{\langle n_a, \text{pk}(k_a) \rangle\}_{\text{pk}(k_b)} \vdash \{\langle x, y \rangle\}_{\text{pk}(k_b)} \\ X_2 \text{ pk}(k_a), \text{pk}(k_b), \{\langle n_a, \text{pk}(k_a) \rangle\}_{\text{pk}(k_b)}, \{\langle x, n_b, \text{pk}(k_b) \rangle\}_y \vdash \{\langle n_a, z, \text{pk}(k_b) \rangle\}_{\text{pk}(k_a)} \end{array}$$

A solution

- $\sigma = \{x \mapsto n_a ; y \mapsto \text{pk}(k_a) ; z \mapsto n_b\}$, and
- $\theta = \{X_1 \mapsto \text{ax}_3 ; X_2 \mapsto \text{ax}_4\}$.

Static equivalence : $\phi \sim \phi'$

Given two sequences of terms ϕ, ϕ' , the intruder cannot distinguish them.

- $\forall (\xi, \xi') \in \Pi^2, \xi\phi\downarrow = \xi'\phi\downarrow \Leftrightarrow \xi\phi'\downarrow = \xi'\phi'\downarrow$
- $\forall \xi \in \Pi, \xi\phi\downarrow \text{ is a message } \Leftrightarrow \xi\phi'\downarrow \text{ is a message}$

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Example 1

- $\phi_1 = a, \{a\}_b, b$
- $\phi_2 = a, \{c\}_b, b$

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Example 1 : Non-equivalent

- $\phi_1 = a, \{a\}_b, b \quad \text{dec}(ax_2, ax_3)\phi_1\downarrow = a = ax_1\phi_1\downarrow$
- $\phi_2 = a, \{c\}_b, b \quad \text{dec}(ax_2, ax_3)\phi_2\downarrow = c \neq ax_1\phi_2\downarrow$

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Example 2 :

- $\phi_1 = a, \{a\}_b$
- $\phi_2 = a, \{c\}_b$

Static equivalence

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Example 2 : Equivalent

- $\phi_1 = a, \{a\}_b$
- $\phi_2 = a, \{c\}_b$

$$C \approx_s C'$$

Two constraint system C and C' are in symbolic equivalence iff :

- for all $(\theta, \sigma) \in \text{Sol}(C)$, there exists σ' such that $(\theta, \sigma') \in \text{Sol}(C')$ and $\phi\sigma \sim \phi'\sigma'$
- for all $(\theta, \sigma') \in \text{Sol}(C')$, there exists σ such that $(\theta, \sigma) \in \text{Sol}(C)$, and $\phi\sigma \sim \phi'\sigma'$

Example 1

$$\begin{array}{l} a, b \quad \vdash x \\ a, b, \{x\}_k \quad \vdash \{a\}_k \end{array}$$
$$\begin{array}{l} a, b \quad \vdash x \\ a, b, \{a\}_k \quad \vdash \{a\}_k \end{array}$$

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Non-equivalent

The substitution $\theta = \{X_1 \mapsto ax_2, X_2 \mapsto ax_3\}$ is only a solution for the second constraint system with $\sigma = \{x \mapsto b\}$, and

Example 2

$$\begin{array}{l} \{n_a\}_k, \quad \vdash \{x\}_k \\ \{n_a\}_k, \{f(x)\}_k, k \quad \vdash \{f(n_a)\}_k \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l} \{n_a\}_k, \quad \vdash \{x\}_k \\ \{n_a\}_k, \{f(x)\}_k, k' \quad \vdash \{f(n_a)\}_k \end{array}$$

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Non-equivalent

- A solution : $\sigma = \sigma' = \{x \mapsto n_a\}$, and
 $\theta = \{X_1 \mapsto ax_1, X_2 \mapsto ax_2\}$
- $\phi\sigma \not\sim \phi'\sigma' : \xi = f(\text{dec}(ax_1, ax_3)), \xi' = \text{dec}(ax_2, ax_3)$


- Input : two constraint systems : C and C'
- Problem : is $C \approx_s C'$?
- Reduce the problem to a finite conjunction of constraint systems equivalence :

$$C_1 \approx_s C'_1 \wedge \dots \wedge C_n \approx_s C'_n$$

- Decidability of each $C_i \approx_s C'_i$ has to be trivial


The algorithm

- Set of rules.
- Each rule takes a couple of constraint system as input
- Each rule creates two couples of constraint system as output



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The application of the rules creates a binary tree where each node is a couple of constraint systems.

Theorem

Our set of rules is :

- complete,
- sound
- and terminates


for the problem of deciding the symbolic equivalence of constraint systems.

`www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/~cheval/programs/index.php`


Example 1

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} a, b \vdash \{a\}_b \\ c, d \vdash \{x\}_c \end{array} \right. \begin{array}{l} \nearrow \\ \searrow \end{array}$$

Example 1




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
Example 2

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} a, b \vdash \{a\}b \\ c, d \vdash c \end{array} \right. \begin{array}{l} \nearrow \\ \searrow \end{array}$$

Example 2




Example 2




Example 3

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} a, b \vdash \{a\}b \\ c, d \vdash x \end{array} \right. \begin{array}{l} \nearrow \\ \searrow \end{array}$$

Example 3



Example 3



Termination problem

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} a \vdash \{x_1\}_{x_2} \\ a, b \vdash x_1 \end{array} \right. \longrightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{l} a \vdash x_1 \\ a \vdash x_2 \\ a, b \vdash x_1 \end{array} \right.$$

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} a \vdash y_1 \\ a, b \vdash \{y_1\}_{y_2} \end{array} \right. \longrightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{l} a \vdash z_1 \\ a \vdash z_2 \\ a, b \vdash \{\{z_1\}_{z_2}\}_{y_2} \end{array} \right.$$

with $y_1 \stackrel{?}{=} \{z_1\}_{z_2}$

Termination problem

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} a \vdash x_1 \\ a \vdash x_2 \\ a, b \vdash x_1 \end{array} \right.$$

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} a \vdash \{t_1\}_{t_2} \\ a \vdash x_2 \\ a, b \vdash t_1 \\ a, b \vdash t_2 \end{array} \right.$$

with $x_1 \stackrel{?}{=} \{t_1\}_{t_2}$

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Termination problem

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----->

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
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with $y_1 \stackrel{?}{=} \{z_1\}_{z_2}$

There exists a strategy on the rules which terminates

Decision procedure for symbolic equivalence

- disequation
- set of constraint systems
- more cryptographic primitives

Decision procedure for symbolic equivalence

- disequation
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Decision procedure for trace equivalence

- else branch
- non deterministic protocol