Symbolic Models for Isolated Execution Environments
Charlie Jacomme, Steve Kremer, and Guillaume Scerri. Symbolic Models for Isolated Execution Environments. In Proceedings of the 2nd IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P'17), pp. 530–545, IEEE Computer Society, Paris, France, April 2017.
doi:10.1109/EuroSP.2017.16
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Abstract
Isolated Execution Environments (IEEs), such as ARM TrustZone and Intel SGX, offer the possibility to execute sensitive code in isolation from other malicious programs, running on the same machine, or a potentially corrupted OS. A key feature of IEEs is the ability to produce reports binding cryptographically a message to the program that produced it, typically ensuring that this message is the result of the given program running on an IEE. We present a symbolic model for specifying and verifying applications that make use of such features. For this we introduce the S$\ell$APIC process calculus, that allows to reason about reports issued at given locations. We also provide tool support, extending the SAPIC/TAMARIN toolchain and demonstrate the applicability of our framework on several examples implementing secure outsourced computation (SOC), a secure licensing protocol and a one-time password protocol that all rely on such IEEs.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{JKS-eurosp17,
abstract = {Isolated Execution Environments (IEEs), such as ARM
TrustZone and Intel SGX, offer the possibility to
execute sensitive code in isolation from other
malicious programs, running on the same machine, or
a potentially corrupted OS. A key feature of IEEs is
the ability to produce reports binding
cryptographically a message to the program that
produced it, typically ensuring that this message is
the result of the given program running on an
IEE. We present a symbolic model for specifying and
verifying applications that make use of such
features. For this we introduce the S{$\ell$}APIC
process calculus, that allows to reason about
reports issued at given locations. We also provide
tool support, extending the SAPIC/TAMARIN toolchain
and demonstrate the applicability of our framework
on several examples implementing secure outsourced
computation (SOC), a secure licensing protocol and a
one-time password protocol that all rely on such
IEEs.},
address = {Paris, France},
author = {Jacomme, Charlie and Kremer, Steve and Scerri,
Guillaume},
booktitle = {{P}roceedings of the 2nd IEEE European Symposium on
Security and Privacy (EuroS\&P'17)},
pages = {530--545},
doi = {10.1109/EuroSP.2017.16},
month = apr,
publisher = {IEEE Computer Society},
title = {Symbolic Models for Isolated Execution Environments},
year = 2017,
acronym = {{EuroSP}'17},
nmonth = 4,
url = {https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01533708/document},
}