SPOOC: Formal verification of protocols based on short authenticated strings

Formal verification of protocols based on short authenticated strings

Stéphanie Delaune, Steve Kremer, and Ludovic Robin. Formal verification of protocols based on short authenticated strings. In Proceedings of the 30th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF'17), IEEE Computer Society Press, Santa Barbara, USA, August 2017.

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Abstract

Modern security protocols may involve humans, in order to compare or copy short strings between different devices. Multi-factor authentication protocols, such as Google 2-factor or 3D-secure are typical examples of such protocols. However, such short strings may be subject to brute force attacks. In this paper we propose a symbolic model which includes attacker capabilities for guessing short strings, and producing collisions when short strings are produced by weak hash functions. We propose a new decision procedure for analysing (a bounded number of sessions of) protocols that rely on short strings. The procedure has been integrated in the AKISS tool and tested on protocols from the ISO/IEC 9798-6:2010 standard.

BibTeX

@inproceedings{DKR-csf17,
  abstract =	 {Modern security protocols may involve humans, in
                  order to compare or copy short strings between
                  different devices.  Multi-factor authentication
                  protocols, such as Google 2-factor or 3D-secure are
                  typical examples of such protocols. However, such
                  short strings may be subject to brute force
                  attacks. In this paper we propose a symbolic model
                  which includes attacker capabilities for guessing
                  short strings, and producing collisions when short
                  strings are produced by weak hash functions. We
                  propose a new decision procedure for analysing (a
                  bounded number of sessions of) protocols that rely
                  on short strings. The procedure has been integrated
                  in the AKISS tool and tested on protocols from the
                  ISO/IEC 9798-6:2010 standard.},
  address =	 {Santa Barbara, USA},
  author =	 {Delaune, St{\'e}phanie and Kremer, Steve and Robin,
                  Ludovic},
  booktitle =	 {{P}roceedings of the 30th {IEEE} {C}omputer
                  {S}ecurity {F}oundations {S}ymposium ({CSF}'17)},
  month =	 aug,
  publisher =	 {{IEEE} Computer Society Press},
  title =	 {Formal verification of protocols based on short
                  authenticated strings},
  year =	 2017,
  acronym =	 {{CSF}'17},
  nmonth =	 8,
}