Private votes on untrusted platforms: models, attacks and provable scheme
Sergiu Bursuc, Constantin-Cătălin Drăgan, and Steve Kremer. Private votes on untrusted platforms: models, attacks and provable scheme. In Proceedings of the 4th IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P'19), IEEE Computer Society Press, Stockholm, Sweden, June 2019.
doi:10.1109/EuroSP.2019.00050
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Abstract
Modern e-voting systems deploy cryptographic protocols on a complex infrastructure involving different computing platforms and agents. It is crucial to have appropriate specification and evaluation methods to perform rigorous analysis of such systems, taking into account the corruption and computational capabilities of a potential attacker. In particular, the platform used for voting may be corrupted, e.g. infected by malware, and we need to ensure privacy and integrity of votes even in that case.
We propose a new definition of vote privacy, formalized as a computational indistinguishability game, that allows to take into account such refined attacker models; we show that the definition captures both known and novel attacks against several voting schemes; and we propose a scheme that is provably secure in this setting. We moreover formalize and machine-check the proof in the EasyCrypt theorem prover.
BibTeX
@inproceedings{BDK-eurosp19,
abstract = {Modern e-voting systems deploy cryptographic
protocols on a complex infrastructure involving
different computing platforms and agents. It is
crucial to have appropriate specification and
evaluation methods to perform rigorous analysis of
such systems, taking into account the corruption and
computational capabilities of a potential
attacker. In particular, the platform used for
voting may be corrupted, e.g. infected by malware,
and we need to ensure privacy and integrity of votes
even in that case. \par We propose a new definition
of vote privacy, formalized as a computational
indistinguishability game, that allows to take into
account such refined attacker models; we show that
the definition captures both known and novel attacks
against several voting schemes; and we propose a
scheme that is provably secure in this setting. We
moreover formalize and machine-check the proof in
the EasyCrypt theorem prover. },
address = {Stockholm, Sweden},
author = {Bursuc, Sergiu and Constantin-C\u{a}t\u{a}lin
Dr\u{a}gan and Kremer, Steve},
booktitle = {{P}roceedings of the 4th IEEE European Symposium on
Security and Privacy (EuroS\&P'19)},
month = jun,
publisher = {{IEEE} Computer Society Press},
title = {Private votes on untrusted platforms: models,
attacks and provable scheme},
year = 2019,
acronym = {{EuroS\&P}'19},
nmonth = 6,
doi = {10.1109/EuroSP.2019.00050},
url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8806713},
}