Secure composition of PKIs with public key protocols

Secure composition of PKIs with public key protocols. Vincent Cheval, Véronique Cortier, and Bogdan Warinschi. In Proceedings of the 30th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF'17), pp. 144 – 158, IEEE Computer Society Press, August 2017.

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Abstract

We use symbolic formal models to study the composition of public key-based protocols with public key infrastructures (PKIs). We put forth a minimal set of requirements which a PKI should satisfy and then identify several reasons why composition may fail. Our main results are positive and offer various trade-offs which align the guarantees provided by the PKI with those required by the analysis of protocol with which they are composed. We consider both the case of ideally distributed keys but also the case of more realistic PKIs.
Our theorems are broadly applicable. Protocols are not limited to specific primitives and compositionality asks only for minimal requirements on shared ones. Secure composition holds with respect to arbitrary trace properties that can be specified within a reasonably powerful logic. For instance, secrecy and various forms of authentication can be expressed in this logic. Finally, our results alleviate the common yet demanding assumption that protocols are fully tagged.

BibTeX

@InProceedings{CSF2017-PKI,
  author = 	 {Vincent Cheval and V\'eronique Cortier and Bogdan Warinschi},
  title = 	 {Secure composition of {PKI}s with public key protocols},
  booktitle = {{P}roceedings of the 30th {IEEE} {C}omputer {S}ecurity {F}oundations {S}ymposium ({CSF}'17)},
  year = 	 {2017},
     month = {August}, 
   publisher = {{IEEE} Computer Society Press},
  abstract = {We use symbolic formal models to study the composition of public key-based protocols with public key infrastructures (PKIs). We put forth a minimal set of requirements which a PKI should satisfy and then identify several reasons why composition may fail. 
Our main results are positive and offer various trade-offs which align the guarantees provided by the PKI with those required by the analysis of protocol with which they are composed. 
We consider both the case of ideally distributed keys but also the case of more realistic PKIs.
\par
Our theorems are broadly applicable. 
Protocols are not limited to specific primitives and compositionality asks only for minimal requirements on shared ones.  
Secure composition holds with respect to arbitrary trace properties that can be specified within a reasonably powerful logic.  For instance, secrecy and various forms of authentication can be expressed in this logic. 
Finally, our results alleviate the common yet demanding assumption that protocols are fully tagged. 
},
pages ={144 -- 158},
doi ={10.1109/CSF.2017.28},
}