Synthetizing secure protocols

Synthetizing secure protocols. Véronique Cortier, Bogdan Warinschi, and Eugen Zalinescu. In Proceedings of the 12th European Symposium On Research In Computer Security (ESORICS'07), pp. 406–421, 4734, Springer, Dresden, Germany, September 2007.

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Abstract

We propose a general transformation that maps a cryptographic protocol that is secure in an extremely weak sense (essentially in a model where no adversary is present) into a protocol that is secure against a fully active adversary which interacts with an unbounded number of protocol sessions, and has absolute control over the network. The transformation works for arbitrary protocols with any number of participants, written with usual cryptographic primitives. Our transformation provably preserves a large class of security properties that contains secrecy and authenticity.
An important byproduct contribution of this paper is a modular protocol development paradigm where designers focus their effort on an extremely simple execution setting â€“ security in more complex settings being ensured by our generic transformation. Conceptually, the transformation is very simple, and has a clean, well motivated design. Each message is tied to the session for which it is intended via digital signatures and on-the-fly generated session identifiers, and prevents replay attacks by encrypting the messages under the recipientâ€™s public key.

BibTeX

@InProceedings{CWZ-ESORICS07,
  author = 	 {V\'eronique Cortier and Bogdan Warinschi and Eugen Zalinescu},
  title = 	 {Synthetizing secure protocols},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 12th European Symposium On Research In Computer Security (ESORICS'07)},
  pages = 	 {406-421},
  year = 	 {2007},
  volume = 	 {4734},
  address = 	 {Dresden, Germany},
  month = 	 {September},
  publisher = {Springer},
  DOI = {10.1007/978-3-540-74835-9_27},
  abstract = {We propose a general transformation that maps a cryptographic protocol 
that is secure in an extremely weak sense (essentially in a model where no adversary 
is present) into a protocol that is secure against a fully active adversary which 
interacts with an unbounded number of protocol sessions, and has absolute control 
over the network. The transformation works for arbitrary protocols with any number 
of participants, written with usual cryptographic primitives. Our transformation
 provably preserves a large class of security properties that contains secrecy and 
authenticity.
\par
An important byproduct contribution of this paper is a modular protocol development 
paradigm where designers focus their effort on an extremely simple execution setting 
â€“ security in more complex settings being ensured by our generic transformation. 
Conceptually, the transformation is very simple, and has a clean, well motivated 
design. Each message is tied to the session for which it is intended via digital 
signatures and on-the-fly generated session identifiers, and prevents replay attacks 
by encrypting the messages under the recipientâ€™s public key.
},
}