Sufficient conditions on properties for an automated verification: theoretical report on the verification of protocols for an extended model of the intruder

Sufficient conditions on properties for an automated verification: theoretical report on the verification of protocols for an extended model of the intruder. Vincent Bernat, Hubert Comon-Lundh, Véronique Cortier, Stéphanie Delaune, Florent Jacquemard, Pascal Lafourcade, Yassine Lakhnech, and Laurent Mazaré. Technical Report 4, projet RNTL PROUVÉ, 2004. 33 pages.

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Abstract

Cryptographic protocols are successfully analyzed using formal methods. However, formal approaches usually consider the encryption schemes as black boxes and assume that an adversary cannot learn anything from an encrypted message except if he has the key. Such an assumption is too strong in general since some attacks exploit in a clever way the interaction between protocol rules and properties of cryptographic operators. Moreover, the executability of some protocols relies explicitly on some algebraic properties of cryptographic primitives such as commutative encryption. We first give an overview of the existing methods in formal approaches for analyzing cryptographic protocols. Then we describe more precisely the results obtained by the partners of the RNTL project PROUVÉ.

BibTeX

@techreport{Prouve:rap4,
  author =        {Bernat, Vincent and Comon{-}Lundh, Hubert and
                   Cortier, V{\'e}ronique and Delaune, St{\'e}phanie and
                   Jacquemard, Florent and Lafourcade, Pascal and
                   Lakhnech, Yassine and Mazar{\'e}, Laurent},
  institution =   {projet RNTL PROUV{\'E}},
  month =         dec,
  note =          {33~pages},
  number =        {4},
  type =          {Technical Report},
  title =         {Sufficient conditions on properties for an automated
                   verification: theoretical report on the verification
                   of protocols for an extended model of the intruder},
  year =          {2004},
  abstract =      {Cryptographic protocols are successfully analyzed
                   using formal methods. However, formal approaches
                   usually consider the encryption schemes as black
                   boxes and assume that an adversary cannot learn
                   anything from an encrypted message except if he has
                   the key. Such an assumption is too strong in general
                   since some attacks exploit in a clever way the
                   interaction between protocol rules and properties of
                   cryptographic operators. Moreover, the executability
                   of some protocols relies explicitly on some algebraic
                   properties of cryptographic primitives such as
                   commutative encryption. We first give an overview of
                   the existing methods in formal approaches for
                   analyzing cryptographic protocols. Then we describe
                   more precisely the results obtained by the partners
                   of the RNTL project PROUV\'{E}.},
}