## Sufficient conditions on properties for an automated verification: theoretical report on the verification of protocols for an extended model of the intruder

** Sufficient conditions on properties for an automated
verification: theoretical report on the verification
of protocols for an extended model of the intruder**. Vincent Bernat, Hubert Comon-Lundh, Véronique Cortier, Stéphanie Delaune, Florent Jacquemard, Pascal Lafourcade, Yassine Lakhnech, and Laurent Mazaré. Technical Report 4, projet RNTL PROUVÉ, 2004. 33 pages.

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### Abstract

Cryptographic protocols are successfully analyzed using formal methods. However, formal approaches usually consider the encryption schemes as black boxes and assume that an adversary cannot learn anything from an encrypted message except if he has the key. Such an assumption is too strong in general since some attacks exploit in a clever way the interaction between protocol rules and properties of cryptographic operators. Moreover, the executability of some protocols relies explicitly on some algebraic properties of cryptographic primitives such as commutative encryption. We first give an overview of the existing methods in formal approaches for analyzing cryptographic protocols. Then we describe more precisely the results obtained by the partners of the RNTL project PROUVÉ.

### BibTeX

@techreport{Prouve:rap4, author = {Bernat, Vincent and Comon{-}Lundh, Hubert and Cortier, V{\'e}ronique and Delaune, St{\'e}phanie and Jacquemard, Florent and Lafourcade, Pascal and Lakhnech, Yassine and Mazar{\'e}, Laurent}, institution = {projet RNTL PROUV{\'E}}, month = dec, note = {33~pages}, number = {4}, type = {Technical Report}, title = {Sufficient conditions on properties for an automated verification: theoretical report on the verification of protocols for an extended model of the intruder}, year = {2004}, abstract = {Cryptographic protocols are successfully analyzed using formal methods. However, formal approaches usually consider the encryption schemes as black boxes and assume that an adversary cannot learn anything from an encrypted message except if he has the key. Such an assumption is too strong in general since some attacks exploit in a clever way the interaction between protocol rules and properties of cryptographic operators. Moreover, the executability of some protocols relies explicitly on some algebraic properties of cryptographic primitives such as commutative encryption. We first give an overview of the existing methods in formal approaches for analyzing cryptographic protocols. Then we describe more precisely the results obtained by the partners of the RNTL project PROUV\'{E}.}, }