Efficiently deciding equivalence for standard primitives and phases

Efficiently deciding equivalence for standard primitives and phases. Véronique Cortier, Stéphanie Delaune, and Antoine Dallon. In Proceedings of the 23rd European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS'18), pp. 491–511, LNCS, 2018.

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Abstract

Privacy properties like anonymity or untraceability are now well identified, desirable goals of many security protocols. Such properties are typically stated as equivalence properties. However, automatically checking equivalence of protocols often yields efficiency issues.
We propose an efficient algorithm, based on graph planning and SAT-solving. It can decide equivalence for a bounded number of sessions, for protocols with standard cryptographic primitives and phases (often necessary to specify privacy properties), provided protocols are well-typed, that is encrypted messages cannot be confused. The resulting implementation, SAT-Equiv, demonstrates a significant speed-up w.r.t. other existing tools that decide equivalence, covering typically more than 100 sessions. Combined with a previous result, SAT-Equiv can now be used to prove security, for some protocols, for an unbounded number of sessions.

BibTeX

@InProceedings{SAT-Equiv-Esorics18,
  author = 	 {V\'eronique Cortier and St\'ephanie Delaune and Antoine Dallon},
  title = 	 {Efficiently deciding equivalence for standard primitives and phases},
  booktitle = {{P}roceedings of the 23rd {E}uropean {S}ymposium on {R}esearch in {C}omputer {S}ecurity (ESORICS'18)},
  year = 	 {2018},
  abstract = {Privacy properties like anonymity or untraceability are now well
identified, desirable goals of many security protocols. Such
properties are typically stated as equivalence properties. 
However, automatically checking equivalence of protocols often yields
efficiency issues.
\par
We propose an efficient algorithm, based on graph planning and
SAT-solving. It can decide equivalence for a bounded number of
sessions, for protocols with standard cryptographic primitives and
phases (often necessary to specify privacy properties), provided
protocols are well-typed, that is encrypted messages cannot be
confused.
The resulting implementation, SAT-Equiv, demonstrates a significant
speed-up w.r.t. other existing tools that decide equivalence,
covering typically more than 100 sessions. 
Combined with a previous result, 
SAT-Equiv can now be used to prove security, 
for some protocols, for an unbounded number of sessions.
},
  OPTeditor = 	 {},
  OPTvolume = 	 {},
  OPTnumber = 	 {},
  OPTseries = 	 {},
  pages = 	 {491--511},
  OPTmonth = 	 {},
  OPTaddress = 	 {},
  OPTorganization = {},
  publisher = {LNCS},
  OPTnote = 	 {},
  OPTannote = 	 {},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-99073-6_24},
}