A note on replay attacks that violate privacy in electronic voting schemes

A note on replay attacks that violate privacy in electronic voting schemes. Ben Smyth and Véronique Cortier. Rapport de recherche RR-7643, INRIA, 2011.

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Abstract

In our previous work, we have shown that the Helios 2.0 electronic voting protocol does not satisfy ballot independence and exploit this weakness to violate privacy; in particular, the Helios scheme is shown to be vulnerable to a replay attack. In this note we examine two further electronic voting protocols -- namely, the schemes by Sako & Kilian and Schoenmakers -- that are known not to satisfy ballot independence and demonstrate replay attacks that violate privacy.

BibTeX

@techreport{SMYTH:2011:INRIA-00599182:1,
    hal_id = {inria-00599182},
    title = {{A note on replay attacks that violate privacy in electronic voting schemes}},
    author = {Smyth, Ben and Cortier, V{\'e}ronique},
    abstract = {{In our previous work, we have shown that the Helios 2.0 electronic voting protocol does not satisfy ballot independence and exploit this weakness to violate privacy; in particular, the Helios scheme is shown to be vulnerable to a replay attack. In this note we examine two further electronic voting protocols -- namely, the schemes by Sako \& Kilian and Schoenmakers -- that are known not to satisfy ballot independence and demonstrate replay attacks that violate privacy.}},
    keywords = {Ballot Independence, Ballot Secrecy, Electronic Voting, Privacy, Replay Attack, Vulnerability.},
    language = {Anglais},
    affiliation = {CASSIS - INRIA Lorraine - LORIA / LIFC},
    type = {Rapport de recherche},
    institution = {INRIA},
    number = {RR-7643},
    year = {2011},
    month = Jun,
}