Secure Refinements of Communication Channels

Secure Refinements of Communication Channels. Vincent Cheval, Véronique Cortier, and Eric le Morvan. In 35th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2015), pp. 575–589, Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs) 45, Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, Dagstuhl, Germany, 2015.

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Abstract

It is a common practice to design a protocol (say Q) assuming some secure channels. Then the secure channels are implemented using any standard protocol, e.g. TLS. In this paper, we study when such a practice is indeed secure.
We provide a characterization of both confidential and authenticated channels. As an application, we study several protocols of the literature including TLS and BAC protocols. Thanks to our result, we can consider a larger number of sessions when analyzing complex protocols resulting from explicit implementation of the secure channels of some more abstract protocol Q.

BibTeX

@InProceedings{CCM-fsttcs15,
  author ={Vincent Cheval and V{\'e}ronique Cortier and Eric le Morvan},
  title ={{Secure Refinements of Communication Channels}},
  booktitle ={35th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2015)},
  pages ={575--589},
  series ={Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN ={978-3-939897-97-2},
  ISSN ={1868-8969},
  year ={2015},
  volume ={45},
  editor ={Prahladh Harsha and G. Ramalingam},
  publisher ={Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik},
  address ={Dagstuhl, Germany},
  doi ={10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2015.575},
abstract = {It is a common practice to design a protocol (say Q) assuming some
secure channels. Then the secure channels are implemented using
any standard protocol, e.g. TLS. In this paper, we study when
such a practice is indeed secure. 
\par
We provide a characterization of both confidential and authenticated
channels. As an application, we study several protocols of the
literature including TLS and BAC protocols. Thanks to our result,
we can consider a larger number of sessions when analyzing complex protocols
resulting from explicit implementation of  the secure channels of some
more abstract protocol Q.},
}